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In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing—the idea that the contents of 
the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological 
niches within which the organisms evolved.  While such a thesis has been defended by 
several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the 
compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three 
things. First, that the notion of selective representing is fully consistent with the realist 
idea of a mind-independent world. Second, that not only are these two consistent, but that 
the latter (the realist conception of a mind-independent world) provides the most 
powerful perspective from which to motivate and understand the differing perceptual and 
cognitive profiles themselves. And third, that the (genuine and important) sense in which 
organism and environment may together constitute an integrated system of scientific 




1.What's In An Umwelt? 
 
The world of the tick, it is sometimes said, is significantly smaller than our own. 
What matters, for the life and flourishing of the tick, is a scanty framework 
consisting, in essence, of three receptor cues and three effector cues (Von 
Uexkull 1934, p. 12). The first effective stimulus is butyric acid, found on the 
skin of mammals. Detection of butyric acid causes the tick to drop from the 
foliage and (with luck) to fall on a live animal. Skin contact triggers running 
about until heat is detected, which then initiates burrowing. Thus it is, that, as 
Von Uexkull tells us, the effective environment, or 'umwelt', of the tick is 
constructed: "out of the vast world which surrounds the tick, three [stimuli] 
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shine forth from the dark like beacons, and serve as guides to lead her unerringly 
to her goal"(op cit., p. 11). 
But what is this vast world that surrounds the tick? Is it our world? Or 
the world of science? Or something unstructured, elusive, perhaps (dare we say 
it) noumenal? Once we embrace the basic insight that different animals perceive 
and cognize a "relevant-to-my-lifestyle world, as opposed to a world-with-all-
its-perceptual properties" (Churchland et al 1994, p. 56), can we properly stop 
short of the non-realist conclusion that our perceptual world, and the world of 
science, too, are in some deep sense perceiver-dependent? (Varela et al 1991, p. 
173). Could it be Umwelts 'all the way down'?  
Clark (1997) claims that we can, and should, stop short of any non-
realist conclusion: that we can, and should, stop short of the problematic idea 
that objects and their properties are not independent of the mind, asserting 
merely that the "aspects of real-world structure which biological brains represent 
will often be tightly geared to specific needs and sensori-motor capacities" (op 
cit., p. 173). Let us call this latter thesis, shared by Clark, Churchland et al, 
Akins (1996) and others, the thesis of selective representing. Chemero (1998) 
has argued that non-realist conclusions follow directly (like it or not) from the 
thesis of selective representing and also from recognition (see Section 3 below) 
of complex interplay between organism and environment and between sensing, 
thought and action.  
In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of 
Umwelts and selective representing is fully consistent with the realist idea of a 
mind-independent world. Second, that not only are these two consistent, but that 
the latter (the realist conception of a mind-independent world) provides the most 
powerful perspective from which to motivate and understand the differing 
perceptual and cognitive profiles themselves. And third, that the (genuine and 
important) sense in which organism and environment may together constitute an 
integrated system of scientific interest poses no additional threat (despite the 




2. Selective Representing Versus World-Making 
 
In some recent work (eg Hutchins (1995) (Clark (1997), Hurley (1998)) there is 
much emphasis on the blurring of boundaries between mind and world. What 
may on one occasion be an object of a subject's representations and 
computations—say a seen and manipulated pencil—may on another occasion 
function more like a part of the subject, as when the presence of pencil and 
paper become assimilated into the cognitive system with which a subject 
confronts a complex problem domain. 
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Such blurring of the mind/world boundary must, however, be 
recognized as conceptually distinct from another class of theses that wish to 
demolish the distinction between mind and world. Such views include the 
various idealisms, perspectivalisms, constructivisms, relativisms, and 
subjectivisms that have peppered the philosophical landscape for as long as 
there has been a philosophical landscape. Common to such views is the doctrine 
that what we represent cannot exist independently of our representing it. In 
contrast are realist and objectivist views that allow that what we represent really 
would be the way we represent it even if unrepresented. 
The view expressed in Clark (1997), for example, is explicitly 
presented as compatible with realism. The kind of mind/world blurring there 
discussed has to do mainly with the way that things external to the outer 
membranes of an organism can be co-opted into the organisms' cognitive 
system. In some, perhaps surprisingly many, cases, it is claimed, the vehicles of 
representation and computation include more than just the organism's nervous 
system, indeed more than what we would typically regard the organism's body. 
What the organism thus represents, however, need not depend on being 
represented for its existence. That is, the organism may still represent things that 
are metaphysically objective. (For more on metaphysical objectivity and related 
notions, see Mandik (1998).) 
In a recent article, Anthony Chemero (1998) argues against the 
compatibility of realism and such embedded, embodied approaches to the mind. 
Chemero argues that emphases on "the embodied, active mind leads to non-
realist conclusions" (paragraph 14). The crux of Chemero's argument moves 
from ideas about what we have termed 'selective representing' to the anti-realist 
conclusion that different ways of representing bring about the existence of 
different worlds that are represented.  
Chemero's argumentative strategy may be unpacked further as follows. 
According to the thesis of selective representing, organisms' representational 
apparatuses operate on a pretty strict need-to-know basis. The way an organism 
represents the world is the result of a quick and dirty solution to a problem 
created by the special circumstances of the organisms' biological needs. 
Different niches give rise to different species-specific representational schemes.  
If it is safe to assume that both gibbons and goldfish represent the world, then it 
is also safe to assume that they represent the world in radically different ways. A 
gibbon may represent the world as having good branches to swing from whereas 
whatever goldfish represent surely doesn't include swinging from tree branches. 
Chemero makes the move from there being multiple species-specific 
representational schemes to there being multiple mind-dependent worlds 
brought about by these different representational schemes. As Chemero sees it, 
our human ways of representing the world—including science—are themselves 
quick and dirty need-to-know solutions to biological problems constrained by 
the biological peculiarities of our species. Our ways of representing are as 
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different from gibbons' ways as the gibbons' ways are from the goldfishes' ways. 
Why, Chemero asks, privilege our way as the one way that gets it right? Why 
privilege our scientific ways of representing the world as the representations that 
represent the way the world really is? 
There are, we think, two initial ways in which Chemero's argument 
goes wrong. The first way involves the supposition that the different ways of 
representing the world are in conflict--that they somehow constitute 
disagreement. Let us suppose that organism X represents only varying 
temperatures and that organism Y represents only varying concentrations of 
sulfur. The organisms are not disagreeing. It is not like X represents the 
presence of temperature and Y represents the absence of temperature. And since 
X and Y are not in disagreement, it is entirely consistent to maintain that both X 
and Y represent the way the world really is.  
Now there is a way to import disagreement into the situation of X and 
Y, but such a way is entirely illicit. One may attempt to redescribe the situation 
by saying that X represents the world as containing ONLY temperature and 
saying that Y represents the world as containing ONLY sulfur. Thus X and Y 
are representing the same thing in contradicting ways (on the assumption that 
temperature is not sulfur). The key point here is that such simple organisms 
simply are not equipped to represent the world as a whole and predicate of it the 
presence of ONLY varying degrees of sulfur. They simply do not have the 
conceptual resources to pull this off. Instead the situation is akin to one person 
saying that dogs are furry and another person saying that dogs have four legs. 
While each person is saying different things, the situation need not be one of 
disagreement, thus it is entirely consistent to maintain that both people the way 
dogs really are. 
We think that the illicit importation of disagreement arises by treating 
as interchangeable "X only represents Y as Z" and "X represents Y as only Z." 
One must guard against such a maneuver. One must not treat as interchangeable 
the phrases like "The only things that George thinks about are cheese burgers" 
and "George thinks that only cheese burgers exist". In the first situation, George 
need employ only the concept of cheeseburgers. But in the second situation, 
George needs in addition to the concept of cheeseburgers, the concepts of 
existence and negation.  
We suspect that Chemero does not adequately guard against such an 
illicit move. Chemero writes: 
 
Because the needs of one type of animal can be are so different from those 
of another, the perceptual systems that result will constitute the world in 
very different ways, as full of barbecues and highways and myriad other 
things for humans, but, for example, as containing only three things—
what we see as butyric acid, pressure and temperature changes—for ticks 
(see von Uexkull, 1934, p. 10). (paragraph 15)  
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In the above passage, the assertion that ticks represent the world as containing 
only butyric acid, pressure and temperature changes is unwarranted and may not 
be inferred from the mere fact that the only aspects of the world ticks are 
capable of representing are butyric acid, pressure and temperature changes. 
It is one thing to say that ticks represent only X, Y and Z. It is an 
entirely different thing to say that ticks represent the world as having only X, Y, 
and Z. The latter case is what is needed for the tick's representations to be in 
conflict with ours. But the former case is all that BT is committed to, and the 
former case is consistent with realism. 
The second way that Chemero goes wrong is by a fallacious 
supposition of the exclusivity of functions. The fallacy is to infer from the 
premise that the function of organisms' representational schemes is to get by, to 
the conclusion that the function of organisms' representational schemes is to 
represent the way the world really objectively is. Chemero writes:  
 
[G]iven the way evolution works, we should not think of the perceptual 
systems (or any parts of animals) as ideal solutions to problems posed by 
the environment. Instead, animals that survive and reproduce are those that 
do well enough to find food and so on. So, there is no reason to assume 
that any particular animal's perceptual system gets the world, as it is 
independently of thought, just exactly right; they all do only well enough. 
( paragraph 15) 
 
Continuing on this theme, Chemero writes: 
 
Consider that Clark argues that "higher thought," the kind exhibited in 
mathematical and scientific theorizing, depends on the scaffolding 
provided by public language. He also suggests (pp. 211-13) that language 
is adapted to the way our brains worked pre-linguistically; human 
language, that is, is adapted to and built upon action-oriented 
representations. But, as we have seen, these representations are biased by 
pressures to fulfill human needs throughout evolutionary history. And if 
the foundation on which language is built is biased, it is overwhelmingly 
likely that language itself is similarly biased. So if physics and other 
sciences depend upon our language-using abilities (and Clark argues that 
they do), they have no claim on being reflections of the world-in-itself." 
(paragraph 19) 
 
Chemero's passages echo suspicions that have been around for a while. 
For example Patricia Churchland (1987) urges "Looked at from an evolutionary 
point of view, the principle function of nervous systems is to get the body parts 
where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . Truth, 
whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost" (pp. 548-549). 
We offer in response that two different functions can be compatible: an 
organism can be tightly fit into a particular and peculiar niche and represent the 
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way things really are. To suppose otherwise, that is, to suppose the exclusivity 
of the two functions is like arguing that the function of a stop sign is not to get 
cars to stop because the function of a stop sign is to help prevent car accidents 
(See also Grush and Mandik (in press)). A tick may represent just what it needs 
to get by: concentrations of butyric acid etc.. But this is entirely compatible with 
representing the way things really are: as being concentrations of butyric acid, 
etc.. 
The rhetorical device Chemero employs and that is worth pointing out 
is the way that he moves between the phrases "The way X represents the world" 
and "X's world". This rhetorical device paves a smooth passage for anti-realism 
for it makes it seem that there is a world for each way of representing-that 
different representational schemes are different ways of world-making. 
Admittedly, such language is encouraged by the introduction of appealing to 
Umwelts in the first place. Nonetheless, one must avoid the view that makes 
idealism rest on the following tautology: the only world that we represent is a 
world that is represented by us. Now, of course, the world represented by us is 
representation dependent in at least this sense: it depends on being represented 
by us for its being represented by us. But this can't be what the realist and anti-
realist are disagreeing about. We mention this point not to attribute it to 
Chemero, only to point out the dangerous proximity between the tautologous 
version of anti-realism and the rhetoric employed in these discussions. 
 
 
3. Beyond Selective Representing? 
 
One can, it seems, have one's Umwelts and a robust scientific realism too. Or at 
any rate, Chemero's specific attempt to derive the non-realist conclusions 
directly from the notion of selective representing seems to fail. All that the thesis 
of selective representing really works against, we want to say, is a kind of hyper-
realism that gives some special place to our native take on the structure of the 
world. Objectivism, understood simply as the view that there is a mind-
independent world that has some mind-independent properties and features to 
which life has adapted (changing things in the process, to be sure), seems, 
moreover, to be the natural stance from which to assert the very idea that 
different kinds of organism, with different needs and different modes of 
perceptual and motor engagement with the world, will become sensitized to 
different aspects of this common underlying reality. Different needs and niches 
yield different native takes on the world. Different needs and niches may then 
lead different animals, if they are sufficiently advanced, to carve up the world 
into objects and properties in varying ways. This too is compatible with 
objectivism, just as the metaphor of a single and perfectly real cake 
accommodating many different carvings suggests. There are, however, at least 
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two further and deeper problems that might then motivate a non-realist 
conclusion hereabouts, and we want to end with a word or two on each. 
The first is what might be called the problem of characterization . It is 
one thing to simply assert the existence of a common, underlying reality to 
which various animals are variously adapted. It is another thing, alas, to say 
something concrete about the character of that reality, about what that reality is 
like: to describe, if you will, the properties of the cake, prior to our native 
carving. In personal communications, Chemero suggests that this broadly 
Kantian worry is, for him, the real driving force behind his anti-objectivism. We 
agree that this is a hairy topic, but want to insist on a simple realist response. 
The very idea of multiple Umwelts, at least in the way we want to motivate and 
deploy it, is a scientific one. It is an idea rooted in the observation that ticks, for 
example, are sensitive to the butyric acid found on mammalian skin and that, as 
Von Uexkull (1934,p.11) himself put it "out of the whole environment, no 
stimulus affects [the tick] until a mammal approaches, whose blood she needs 
before she can bear her young". This whole Umwelt-laden story depends on 
taking seriously the set of environmental features and properties picked out by 
our scientific understanding.  
Part of that understanding includes the notion that the sorts of things 
that the tick is responsive to—temperature and butyric acid-are the sorts of 
things that exist independently of tick's responsivity. The scientific story 
licenses saying that the tick is responsive to stuff that would be there even if the 
tick were not. Chemero wonders what reason the scientific realist has for 
supposing that human Umwelten capture the way the world really is. The reason 
the realist provides is the same reason for supposing that tick Umwelten capture 
the way the world really is: the world really does contain concentrations of 
butyric acid and ticks are responsive to those concentrations.  
Taking science seriously as a picture of mind-independent reality is, we 
think, a pre-condition of using the kinds of evidence and argument both Clark, 
Churchland et al, and Von Uexkull deploy. True, Von Uexkull talks also of the 
Umwelt of the astronomer, a scientist. But this strikes us as more a piece of 
phenomenology (a comment on the objects most immediately salient in the 
astronomers reflective domain) rather than a claim that science cannot claim, in 
some fair measure, to depict the larger environment of which the tick and indeed 
the astronomer (immersed in her subject) are sensitive to only tiny parts. (And if 
that isn't what Von Uexkull thought, we think he should have! Incidentally, the 
same goes, as one of us argued long, long ago, for the Evolutionary 
Epistemologist who must likewise negotiate a tricky compromise between 
accepting her own somewhat species-specific perspective and undermining the 
science-based generality of her own claims- see Clark 1986). 
The second deep problem is, in some ways, rather more interesting. We 
don't know if Chemero has this one in mind or not. We can call it the problem of 
co-constitution and it goes something like this. Our defense of realism, it may be 
Selective representing and world-making. P. Mandik and A. Clark.  
Draft: Do not quote or cite. Comments welcome. 
Page 8 
 
objected, buys into a scientifically suspect idea of selective representing. We 
sometimes spoke as if there was a world, described by human science, full of 
objects and properties such that different animals simply pick on different pre-
existing things. The tick picks on butyric acid, the astronomer on stars and 
planets, the cat (literally) on the mouse. But sensing and perceiving, so this 
powerful objection goes, are not always (perhaps not ever?) like that. 
Sometimes, it is best to think not in terms of simple information pick-up so 
much as of the coupled, and even creative, dynamics of an organism-
environment system. In exactly this vein Timo Jarvilehto (1998) has argued that 
"knowledge is formed by perception through a reorganization...of the organism-
environment system rather than through the transmission of information from 
the environment. With the help of efferent effects on receptors, each organism 
creates its own particular world" (op cit, p.1). This sounds, to us, like a claim 
that Chemero would applaud. Indeed, it is even a claim we applaud: but (once 
again) we think it needs to be handled with care if it is to make the correct 
scientific case rather than feed a bloated and dangerous metaphysic. Here, then, 
is a simple example of what we think may be one of the (important) insights that 
Jarvilehto is expressing. 
Consider running to catch a ball (a fly ball in baseball for example). 
Giving perception it's standard role, we might assume that the job of the visual 
system is to take in enough information to project a trajectory so that we can run 
to where the ball will land. It seems, however, that nature has a better solution: 
you simply run so that the ball's trajectory looks straight against the visual 
background (McBeath et al (1995). This solution exploits a powerful invariant in 
the optic flow, discussed in Lee and Reddish (1981). It yields a nice, cheap, 
robust solution. But it also displays, as the roboticist Tim Smithers (1994) points 
out, a somewhat different role for perceptual input. Instead of using sensing to 
get enough information into the system to allow it to 'throw away the world' 
while it solves the problem internally, it uses the sensor as a conduit allowing 
environmental magnitudes to exert a constant influence on behavior. As 
Jarvilehto might put it, the sensor enables the creation of a coupled organism-
environment system whose intrinsic dynamics solves the problem. 
This is, admittedly, a very simple case. There is growing evidence, 
however, that even in more complex cases it may be unwise to depict perception 
as simple information pick-up. Susan Hurley (1998) argues convincingly that 
instead of identifying the intuitive category of perception with something like 
systemic input, we would do better to identify it with whole cycles of input-
output behavior in which sensing and acting combine to yield ongoing adaptive 
fit between organism and world. The perception/action distinction, if it is to be 
maintained at all, then emerges, for Hurley, as a personal level distinction 
concerned with the role of different input-output cycles in intentional behavior. 
(See also Grush (1998) and Mandik (1999) for similarly motor-oriented analyses 
of perception.) 
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This perspective fits well with recent work in so-called interactive 
vision (see Ballard (1991)). It also resonates with the insistence by both 
Merleau-Ponty (1942) and Varela et al (1991) that in perception the organism 
actively elicits the very stimuli to which it then responds. An example from 
Merleau-Ponty captures the idea: 
 
When my hand follows each effort of a struggling animal while holding an 
instrument for capturing it, it is clear that each of my movements responds 
to an external stimulation; but it is also clear that these stimulations could 
not be received without the movements by which I expose my receptors to 
their influence. (1942 p.13) 
 
What this now adds to the simple ball/gaze example is the idea of a kind of 
active creation of the very stimuli to which we respond.  
The theme of active creation is similarly visible in a variety of recent 
treatments that stress the "idiosyncratic", "deictic", "action-oriented" or 
"narcissistic" nature of different organismsm ways of perceiving and conceiving 
their worlds (see Ballard (1991), Agee and Chapman ( 1990), Clark (1997, p. 
47-51, 149-53), Akins ( 1996). Also Dennett (1996, p. 146), Churchland et al 
(1994, p. 56), Michaels and Carello (1981, p. 45)). The idea here--and it is a 
compelling one, as far as it goes--is that the kinds of environmental property and 
features that will matter to different animals will not merely be simple subsets of 
some fixed set of possibilities (licensed by physics). Instead, they will look 
somewhat odd and gerrymandered, reflecting as they do the motor profiles and 
lifestyle proclivities of each different kind of being. Such claims bring us full 
circle to the notion of Umwelts (Umwelten) with which we began. Except we 
now add, as a point of clarification, that Umwelts are indeed deeply "action-
oriented"(Clark, 1997) and that, as a result, the ontology of an Umwelt is not 
just a simple, non-gerrymandered selective subset of the ontology of physics. 
Instead of featuring simple subsets of the properties of a "pre-given world" 
(Varela at al 1991), biological Umwelts consist in complex dynamical couplings 
that reflect the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver (Varela et al, op cit, p. 
173). 
 
Glossed a certain way (as e.g. the 'bringing forth of worlds' (Wheeler (1996) and 
so on) this can begin to sound very much like the kind of anti-realism we mean 
to reject. Yet, as we think the examples show, there is really nothing in even this 
more complex picture that upsets the idea of a fully mind-independent reality. 
For once again, the best way to motivate the cyclic and creative picture itself is 
to appeal to the scientific image of an organism and an embedding environment, 
complete with various features and properties. Given these ingredients, we can 
go on to appreciate how the organism uses sensory channels to couple it's 
behavior with salient environmental features (such as the ball in the angle of 
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gaze example). And we can appreciate how the organism continually acts so as 
to elicit more and better stimuli so as to support adaptive response- a complex 
interplay beautifully captured by Merleau-Ponty in the image of the struggling 
animal. Finally, if we sometimes add structure to our world, in ways that then 
further guide our behavior (think of ants laying chemical trails, or of academics 
using yellow stickies), that just shows that intelligent action can increase the 
amount of real structure in the environment, not that there is no independent 
structure there at all. 
We thus echo Peirce (1955) who writes: "One will meet, for example, 
the virtual assumption that what is relative to thought cannot be real. But why 
not, exactly? Red is relative to sight, but the fact that this or that is in that 
relation to vision that we call being red is not itself relative to sight; it is a real 
fact." (p. 264) Putting it another way, some features may be subjective, but 
whether they are subjective is itself an objective matter (Mandik 1998). The 
features that comprise a creature's Umwelt may reflect the subjective proclivities 
of the creature. Tick Umwelten contain temperatures but not telephones because, 
in part, of tick-relative facts—facts that cannot obtain independently of ticks. 
But the fact that certain facts are tick-relative may itself be an objective fact. A 
similar point can be made in cases in which it is not merely the inclusion of the 
feature in the subject's Umwelt that is subject relative, but the very existence of 
the feature--cases in which the feature is literally created by the representing 
subject. Telephones figure in human Umwelten and humans literally brought 
telephones into existence. But that these relations between humans and 
telephone obtain may itself be objective. Features not created in factories like 
telephones, but instead by the active and reciprocal engagement of 
perceptual/motor systems may likewise be objective. 
Our ability to actively elicit, and sometimes create, useful 
environmental stimuli, added to the fact that we sometimes use sensing to set up 
a channel of influence rather than to build an inner model, does indeed work 
against a simplistic vision of organism-environment interaction and selective 
representing. But it in no way detracts from the idea that these productive cycles 
of organism-environment exchange are themselves best explained by taking 
seriously the idea of an environment, with many intrinsic properties and 
features, embedding an evolved organism, with well-matched sensory channels, 
needs and projects. Indeed, that is the picture we need if we are to justify and 




4. The Last Word...Physics? 
 
What, finally, of physics (and more generally, science (including ethology) 
itself? Is human science just another sensorimotor profile and lifestyle specific 
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probe, incapable of revealing the true (noumenal?) structure of the action-neutral 
environment? It is our suspicion that, at root, it is precisely this belief that 
motivates the non-realist position of Chemero, Cantwell-Smith(1996) , Varela et 
al (1991)and others. It does not seem to us, however, that any of the points we 
have just conceded undermine the claims of human science to describe the 
common reality to which various animals (including ourselves) are variously 
adjusted. For one thing, the categorizations and classifications of science are 
(notoriously) often not those suggested by our native sensorimotor engagements 
with the world. That glass and water should both be counted as liquids can 
hardly be explained by common patterns of sensorimotor engagement or by the 
basic groupings provided by unaugmented human perception.  
Moreover, there is a sense in which our scientific probings are open-
ended. Where the tick is permanently limited to its small, narcissistic (Akins 
(1996)) window on the world, human science constantly builds new and 
different probes, and constructs vastly differing theories by means of which to 
organize and cognize their deliverances. In the human case, more than that of 
any other animal, it is more than biological systems alone that must construct 
and cognize the world: it is the biological system augmented and extended by an 
apparently limitless array of props, aids and cognitive scaffolding: think of pens, 
paper, calculators, computers, alidades, sextants, software agents (for discussion, 
see Clark (1997), Hutchins (1995), Dennett (1995)). Given the ability of the 
human/technological environment to create more and more such structures, aids, 
and probes in a golden loop of reciprocal facilitation, it is not at all clear that 
there are any limits (imposed, as someone might imagine, by our native sensory 
and cognitive endowment) on our technologically mediated capacity to sense 
and comprehend the mind-independent universe: the very universe whose 
objective contours, in dense and reciprocal interaction with the equally objective 
contours of its variegated sentient inhabitants, determines the "bringing forth" of 
sensory, cognitive, and experiential worlds.  
It is perhaps ironic, then, that it may be precisely the blurring of the 
mind/world boundary, by means of various technological innovations that 
extend and transform our cognitive horizons, that ultimately allows human 
thought and reason to transcend its lifestyle-specific origins and to appreciate 
the variety of organism-environment couplings as the complex co-evolutionary 
products of physical forces and natural selection acting in a fully mind-
independent material arena. Not only, it seems, is the kind of boundary blurring 
advanced in Clark (1997) distinct from the various non-realist theses that pepper 
the nearby philosophical landscape: it is actually inimical to such theses, and 
hints not of permanent lifestyle-oriented blinkering and cognitive closure, but of 
open-ended and continuous cognitive change and exploration. In so doing, it 
constitutes an explicit challenge to, for example, recent attempts to fix human 
cognitive horizons directly in terms of human evolutionary history (see e.g. 
Pinker's (1997) story about our congenital incapacity to understand phenomenal 
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consciousness, and compare e.g., the implications of the "neural constructivist" 
manifesto of Quartz & Sejnowski (1997)). 
At the very least, and whatever the reader may make of these last few 
speculations, we see no good reason to suppose that human science is limited 
and lifestyle-reflecting in just the same way as the ticks' perceptual (and, if we 
are generous, cognitive) systems. Chemero, to his credit, attempts to build an 
explicit bridge between the two, arguing (as we saw in Section 2) that science 
depends on language which in turn reflects the pre-linguistic, action-oriented 
substrate of what might be called "native human cognition". There may be 
something in this: perhaps, for example, science depends heavily on the use of 
metaphors derived from our embodied experience (see Lakoff & Johnson 
(1998)). But whatever the grain of truth, it would seem rash indeed to conclude 
that science cannot, for example, advance and justify ideas and frameworks 
directly at odds with our immediate embodied experience: a theory of surfaces, 
for example, which recognizes multiple boundaries, not all of which would 
present themselves as such to a human agent; or a theory of space and time in 
which the two are not distinct, or in which space itself can be curved. In short, 
then, even if science depends on language, and language reflects embodied and 
species-specific experience, it does not seem to follow that science cannot hope 
to discover and express lifestyle-independent truths. The fact that (let us 
suppose) metaphors based on our bodily experiences play a major role in leading 
us to grasp the theory of super-strings (or whatever) does not imply that those 
bodily metaphors are part of the truths thus grasped. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: Von Uexkull's World. 
 
Von Uexkull, as Timo Jarvilehto (personal communication) nicely reminds us, 
had another notion, that of the Funktionskreis - a kind of interactive circle in 
which sensory and motor processes home in on lifestyle-relevant aspects of the 
larger world (the Umgebung). The tick's Unwelt, thus construed, is just a tick-
relevant subset of the Umgebung. The creation and maintenance of an Umwelt, 
on the face of it, thus involves nothing more ontologically threatening than a bit 
of selective sensing and representing. No threats ( as we saw in Section 2 ) to 
realism here. But Von Uexkull, influenced by Kant, also stressed a kind of 
active perception, and clearly glimpsed the large contribution of the organism 
itself to the sensory and cognitive realms it constructs. It is this aspect of active 
construction that leads to the deeper problem discussed in Section 3: the 
problems of active co-constitution and the attendant problem of how to 
characterize the putative common environment. The notion of active 
construction is a crucial one for cognitive science and philosophy. But it leads to 
non-realist conclusions only when combined with (what we believe to be) a 
groundless skepticism about the deliverances of human science. Our view, by 
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contrast, is that the open-ended symbiosis of human biological cognition and 
technological support gives the lie to such radical skepticism, and enables us to 
make increasing scientific sense of complex organism-environment systems. To 
use these emerging ideas as a stick with which to beat the notion of a mind-
independent reality strikes us as perverse indeed. In the end, then, we stand by 
the original claim. Strong non-realist rhetoric compromises, rather than explains, 
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